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Abstract
With the diffusion of the Internet of Things (IoT), computing is becoming
increasingly pervasive, and different heterogeneous networks are integrated
into larger systems. However, as different networks managed by different
parties and with different security requirements are interconnected, security
becomes a primary concern. IoT nodes, in particular, are often deployed “in
the open”, where an attacker can gain physical access to the device. As nodes
can be deployed in unsurveilled or even hostile settings, it is crucial to avoid
escalation from successful attacks on a single node to the whole network, and
from there to other connected networks. It is therefore necessary to secure
the communication within IoT networks, and in particular, maintain context
information private, including the network topology and the location and
identity of the nodes.
In this paper, we propose a protocol achieving anonymous routing
between different interconnected networks, designed for the Internet of
Things and based on the spatial Bloom filter (SBF) data structure. The
protocol enables private communication between the nodes through the use of
anonymous identifiers, which hide their location and identity within the net-
work. As routing information is encrypted using a homomorphic encryption
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scheme, and computed only in the encrypted domain, the proposed routing
strategy preserves context privacy, preventing adversaries from learning the
network structure and topology. This, in turn, significantly reduces their
ability to gain valuable network information from a successful attacks on a
single node of the network, and reduces the potential for attack escalation.
Keywords: Internet of Things, Privacy-preserving Technologies, Anony-
mous Routing, Spatial Bloom Filters.
1 Introduction
The devices and networks that compose the Internet of Things (IoT) are
extremely diverse and heterogeneous in terms of resources, capabilities,
lifespan and communication technologies. New IoT products are constantly
being introduced to the market, and each device is able to gather (for example
through sensors) and process increasing amounts of information. Billions of
smart objects are being immersed in the environment, sensing, interacting,
and cooperating with each other to enable cities and services to become
smarter, with great benefits to the environment, the economy and the society
as a whole. However, if security and privacy concerns are not addressed, the
Internet of Things could also present opportunities for malicious attackers,
exploiting the vulnerabilities of devices that are not always designed with
security in mind. In fact, attacks against smart devices, sensor networks and
the Internet of Things are increasing in both frequency and magnitude [12].
The emerging security threat, however, is not slowing the growing dif-
fusion of systems and services based on IoT and heterogeneous sensor
networks, propelled by the relentless advances in the production of low-cost
embedded devices and sensors. As these technologies are usually deployed
in wireless environments, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) have become a
suitable solution for an increasing number of applications, including health
monitoring, smart agriculture, weather sensing, intrusion detection applica-
tions and industrial control [8, 13]. In urban and suburban contexts, these
networks are often connected to each other, and ultimately to the Internet,
enabling remote monitoring and management as well as autonomous com-
putation. In spite of extensive research in the area, the Internet of Things
and in particular the interconnection of IoT devices and networks still pose a
significant security and privacy risk [11].
IoT devices are often deployed in unsecured areas or outdoor, where they
can be subject to tampering, leading to a potential attacker being able to gain
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control of one or more nodes in the IoT network. The use of wireless com-
munication also makes the network inherently vulnerable to eavesdropping.
For these reasons, it is crucial to design and embed in IoT networks security
mechanisms and protocols than can preserve the security of the network even
in the presence of internal adversaries. In particular, both the communication
between the nodes participating in the network and the context information
(including the location of the nodes and the network organization) should be
protected [11]. In order to preserve the former, and guarantee the privacy of
the communication, nodes can employ encrypted communication protocols.
Research in this area is being targeted at the design of efficient cryptographic
systems, due to the low-power nature and limited computational capabilities
of most IoT devices. In this paper we focus instead on the latter challenge:
preserving context privacy, that is, protecting information on the network
topology, structure and organization, including the identity and network loca-
tion of the nodes in the network [4]. As nodes in IoT network have different
roles, context privacy is crucial to prevent targeted attacks on important
nodes, such as the ones used to aggregate information: an example are WSNs,
which are in general highly vulnerable to attacks targeted at base stations
(the nodes collecting the data gathered by the sensors). Failure of a base
station can disrupt operation of the entire network, making it an ideal target
for an attacker. In order to prevent adversaries from launching both remote,
software-based attacks and physical attacks, the location of base stations and
the network topology should therefore be concealed [5].
1.1 Literature Review
A basic strategy to achieve context privacy is to use flooding and transmis-
sions of fake or dummy packets, which make network traffic observation
more difficult [21]. However, this solution introduces significant overheads
in the communication, and can reduce the efficiency of the IoT network.
More complex strategies are normally based on some flavor of anonymity,
including the use of random walks to route packets anonymously [10].
Random walks have been adopted in a number of designs: Zhang proposed
self-adjusting directed random walks in [22], while GROW (Greedy Random
Walk) [20] introduced a two-way random walk, from both source and desti-
nation, that can reduce the chance of an eavesdropper being able to collect
location information. Finally, layers of encryption can be used to protect the
information at each hop in the walk [6].
More recently, more advanced anonymity techniques have been applied
to the IoT. Black routing and node obscuring for IoT have been proposed
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by Chakrabarty et al. in [3]. Their strategy hides the source of network
traffic via a token-based routing approach, while the destination is obscured
by forwarding the packet beyond the final destination. However, to achieve
anonymity of source-destination pairs, a minimum of 40% of the total IoT
nodes in the path is needed, thus restricting application of this technique
to more complex settings, where different IoT networks are interconnected.
An onion routing protocol derived from Tor has also been designed for the
Internet of Things scenario [15]. This strategy, however, requires IoT nodes to
be able to perform complex computations, which may not always be possible
in power and resource constrained scenarios.
1.2 Contribution
In this paper we introduce a novel anonymous routing mechanism, based on
the spatial Bloom filter data structure and homomorphic encryption. Part of
the results of this article were previously presented by the authors in a shorter
version at the International Workshop on Malicious Software and Hardware
in the Internet of Things, co-located with Computing Frontiers 2017 [17].
The proposed construction is targeted at preserving context privacy within a
network composed of a number of interconnected subetworks. In particular,
our construction can find direct application in all the settings where different
networks, such as wireless sensor networks or networks of smart or embedded
devices, are connected to form a larger network. The anonymous routing
mechanism achieves the following goals: encrypt communication between
nodes; hide the identity and location of the sending and receiving nodes
in a communication between two different subnetworks; hide the network
structure and topology to all the nodes; and hide the origin and destination
of any communication between subnetworks to the routing layer (that is,
the network infrastructure that connects the different subnetworks and is
responsible for the routing of packets between them). These properties enable
context privacy and security against adversaries who control one or more
nodes within the network, and prevent attacks aimed at taking over control of
the network.
2 Preliminaries
In the following we present the main building blocks of the proposed routing
mechanism: first, the spatial Bloom filter (SBF) [2, 16]. Second, the homo-
morphic encryption operations that make it possible to compute the SBF in
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the encrypted domain. For the latter, we base our construction on the Paillier
cryptosystem [14], although any equivalent alternative cipher may be used.
2.1 Spatial Bloom Filters
A Bloom Filter (BF) is a data structure that represents a set of elements in
a space-efficient manner [1]. Bloom filters are widely used in networking
protocols, and have a variety of network security applications [9]. Recently,
Calderoni, et al. proposed a compact data structure based on Bloom filters,
designed to store location information [2, 16]. The structure, called spatial
Bloom filter (SBF), was originally designed for location privacy applications.
Two private positioning protocols were proposed with the SBF, both aimed
at keeping both the user’s exact position and the provider’s monitored areas
private. The SBF was recently evaluated in a comparative assessment with
other similar privacy-preserving techniques, showing promising properties in
several domains [19]. In particular, the SBF is suitable for application beyond
the location privacy field. In this paper, we use the SBF to build a novel private
routing protocol for interconnected networks, a typical scenario in the IoT and
distributed sensor networks domain. In the following, we briefly review the
data structure and its properties relevant to the proposed construction; a full
discussion of the primitive can be found in [2, 16].
A spatial Bloom filter extends the original Bloom Filter idea in order to
support several sets composed of elements belonging to a specific domain E .
A SBF can be used to perform membership queries on the originating set of
elements without knowledge of the set itself but, contrary to the BF, a SBF
can be constructed over multiple sets. Querying a spatial Bloom filter for an
element returns the identifier of the specific set among all the originating sets
in which the element is contained, minus a false positive probability. The
false positive probability depends on a number of parameters chosen during
the filter construction, which can be selected to achieve a desired probability.
Let E be a domain specific set of elements (in this paper elements
represent the IDs of network nodes); a SBF can be defined as follows [2]:
Definition 1. Given the originating sets Δ1,Δ2, . . . ,Δs to be represented
in the filter, let S¯ be the union set S¯ = ⋃Δi∈S Δi and let S be the set of
sets S = {Δ1,Δ2, . . . ,Δs}. Let O be the strict total order over S for which
Δi < Δj for i < j. Let also H = {h1, . . . , hk} be a set of k hash functions
such that each hi ∈ H : {0, 1}∗ → {1, . . . ,m}, that is, each hash function
in H takes binary strings as input and outputs a random number uniformly
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chosen in {1, . . . ,m}. We define the spatial Bloom filter over (S,O) as the
set of couples
B# (S,O) =
⋃
i∈I
〈i,maxLi〉 (1)
where I is the set of all values output by hash functions in H for elements
of S¯
I =
⋃
δ∈S¯,h∈H
h (δ) (2)
and Li is the set of labels l such that:
Li = {l | ∃δ ∈ Δl,∃h ∈ H : h(δ) = i} . (3)
A spatial Bloom filter B# (S,O) can be represented as a vector b#
composed of m values, where the i-th value
b# [i] =
{
l if 〈i, l〉 ∈ B# (S,O)
0 if 〈i, l〉 ∈ B# (S,O) . (4)
For reference, in Table 1 we provide the notation commonly used within
the SBF domain.
The construction of an SBF starts by setting all values in b# to 0.
Then, starting from the first set Δ1, each element belonging to the set is
Table 1 A list of symbols commonly used in SBF literature
Symbol Description
E A domain for elements to be mapped inside a SBF
B# (S,O) A spatial Bloom filter
〈x, y〉 The pair composed by x and y
b# The vector representation of the SBF
b#[i] The i-th cell (position) of the SBF vector representation
k The number of hash functions
m The number of cells of the SBF
n The total number of elements to be inserted into the SBF
s The number of originating sets
Δi The i-th originating set
S The set of originating sets {Δ1, . . . ,Δs}, |S| = s
S¯ The union set
⋃
Δi∈S Δi, where |S¯| = n
O The strict total order over S (Δi < Δj , i < j)
L The set of set labels {1, . . . , s}
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Δ1 :
Δ2 :
Δ3 :
b# (SBF ) : 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b# : 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
b# : 1 2 1 0 2 0 1 0 2 1
b# : 1 3 1 0 2 0 1 3 2 3
Figure 1 Sets Δ1, Δ2 and Δ3 (representing three subnetworks) are used to construct a SBF.
Three hash functions are used to map each element into the filter. In the first step of this
example, the identifiers of two nodes belonging to Δ1 are processed by the hash functions,
resulting in the value ‘1’ being written six times into the SBF. The construction proceeds
likewise for elements of Δ2 and Δ3. Two kinds of collisions are possible, as highlighted: the
first is intra set; the second takes place when elements of sets marked with a greater label
overwrite those with a lower value. The probability of both events can be controlled to prevent
false positives.
processed by each function h ∈ H . Let us suppose h (δ) = i: in that case,
the i-th value of b# will be set to 1 (as 1 is the label associated to Δ1).
Elements belonging to subsequent sets (Δ2, . . . ,Δs) are processed likewise.
It is important to note that collisions between two distinct values are subject
to the SBF collision rule: labels with higher value overwrite those with lesser
value. This procedure is exemplified in Figure 1.
In order to check whether or not an element δu is member of the set Δi ∈
S, two conditions need to be met:
∃h ∈ H : b# [h(δu)] = i and ∀h ∈ H, b# [h(δu)] ≥ i . (5)
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Substantially, one single b# [h(δu)] = 0 is sufficient to state that δu is not
a member of S¯. On the contrary, if b# [h(δu)] = 0 for each hash function,
then δu is a member of the set Δi minus a false positive probability; i is the
lesser value among those returned by the set of hash functions.
2.2 Homomorphic Encryption
In the protocol proposed in this paper, we use homomorphic encryption.
In particular, in the discussion of the protocol we focus on the Paillier
cryptosystem [14], an asymmetric encryption scheme that features notable
homomorphic properties, although any equivalent cipher could be used in its
stead. In general, an encryption scheme has homomorphic properties when it
is possible to compute certain operations on a ciphertext without decrypting
it and, therefore, without knowledge of the decryption key. In particular, we
say an encryption scheme is additively homomorphic when an operation on
a ciphertext and a plaintext results in the sum of the two plaintexts. We
have instead multiplicative homomorphism between an encrypted plaintext
and a plaintext when an operation results into the multiplication of the two
plaintexts. If we identify such operation with the symbol , the following is
true for a multiplicatively homomorphic cipher:
Dec (Enc (p1) p2) = p1 · p2 . (6)
The Paillier cryptosystem is both additively and multiplicatively homo-
morphic. In this case, the product of two ciphertexts will decrypt to the
sum of their corresponding plaintexts (additive property), while an encrypted
plaintext raised to the power of another plaintext will decrypt to the product of
the two plaintexts (multiplicative property). Therefore, for the Paillier cipher:
Dec (Enc (p1)
p2) = p1 · p2 . (7)
This multiplicative property ensures that an encrypted plaintext raised to
the power of a constant k will decrypt to the product of the plaintext and k.
In the proposed protocol, we apply the multiplicative property to a vector,
achieving a secure entrywise product (also known as Hadamard product). We
refer to this operation as to Private Hadamard Product [2], and we define it
in Algorithm 1.
We note here that the Paillier cryptosystem may not be suitable for some
heavily computationally constrained devices: however, the proposed protocol
can be achieved over any additively homomorphic cipher.
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Algorithm 1: Private Hadamard product of an encrypted vector of
natural numbers for a cleartext binary vector
Input Alice:X = (x1, . . . ,xn),X ∈ Nn.
Input Bob:Y = (y1, . . . ,yn),Y ∈ {0, 1}n.
Output Alice:X ·Y.
1 Alice generates a public and private key pair using a multiplicative
homomorphic encryption scheme.
2 Alice sends to Bob the ciphertext vector E = (Enc (x1) , . . . ,Enc (xn)).
3 Bob computes the vectorC = (Enc (x1) y1, . . . ,Enc (xn) yn) and
sends the result to Alice.
4 Alice uses her secret key to decryptC and obtains
D = Dec (C) = (x1 · y1, . . . ,xn · yn) = X ·Y.
3 A Secure Routing Strategy
We study a setting where different, heterogeneous subnetworks are inter-
connected, creating a larger network. The subnetworks are connected to
each other by the routing layer, that is, the part of the overarching network
infrastructure that manages and routes inter-network communication. Each
subnetwork is composed of multiple nodes, and can be connected to the
routing layer either directly, or through one or more gateways. In the case
of Wireless Sensor Networks, these gateways could also represent the base
stations (where information from the sensor node is collected). The aim of
our construction is to enable private routing between the subnetworks. In
particular, we want to prevent an attacker that controls one or more nodes
of the network from being able to learn the topology and structure of the
network. Specifically, he should not be able to: determine the number of
subnetworks, other than those where he controls a node; the location of any
node in the network, that is, to which subnetwork a node belongs. We define
the security of our construction as follows:
Security Definition. Private routing between different subnetworks in a
wider network is achieved when: any node in the network only needs the ID’s
of other nodes in order to communicate with them, and learns nothing about
their position within the network; for each packet received, the routing layer
learns only the subnetwork to which the packet should be routed, and nothing
about the identity of the sending and receiving nodes. Any subnetwork
gateway only routes packets transparently between the subnetwork and the
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routing layer, and, similarly to other nodes in the subnetwork, learns nothing
about the positions of nodes outside its subnetwork.
The security of the construction is analysed in Section 4.
3.1 Routing Strategy
Each node of the network is identified by a unique, random ID. Contrary to
the IP address, the ID does not contain or imply any information regarding
the network structure. Within the network, nodes communicate using their
respective IDs, following a tunneling and encapsulation strategy for lower
level protocols (such as TCP/IP) similar to the one used in other private-
preserving protocols, including onion routing [7]. In practice, communication
between nodes of the network is first tunnelled to the local gateway, then
from the gateway to the routing layer, from then to the destination gateway
and finally to the destination node. Gateways do not have an active role, and
they only relay communication between the nodes in their subnetwork and
the routing layer transparently. In general, each party in the communication
will not reveal unnecessary information to the following one. The gateway of
the sending node, in particular, will not communicate the ID of the node to
the routing layer. As the receiving gateway does not know to which node in
its subnetwork the communication is destined to, it broadcasts the packets to
all nodes in the receiving subnetwork. Since communication is encrypted (as
explained in the following), only the intended receiver will be able to decrypt
the information. An example of network structure is presented in Figure 2.
3.2 Packets and Routing Information
Messages transmitted through the network using the anonymous routing
protocol are composed of two parts: a header, which contains routing
information; and a payload, which is encrypted and encapsulates the commu-
nication being anonymously routed (in practice, the payload contain packets
of lower layer protocols such as UDP or TCP).
In order to encrypt the payload, we assume that each node in the network
has a public/private key pair, and a key distribution mechanism exists between
the nodes, so that each node knowing another node’s ID either knows or can
retrieve the node’s public key as well (discussed below). Encryption of the
payload is performed by the sending node s using the public key Pkr of the
receiving node r, which can then decrypt the transmission using its secret
key Skr . As communication is routed anonymously, the ID of the sender is
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Δ1
Δ2
Δ3
Routing layer
b# (SBF )
2
3
0
1
0
3
1
2
2
0
0
1
Figure 2 A sample sensor network composed of three subnetworks Δ1, Δ2 and Δ3. Each
subnetwork, composed by a set of nodes, represents an Area of Interest (AOI) as described
in [2,16], and is marked with a label. Anonymous routing of packets between the subnetworks
(done by the routing layer) is achieved using an SBF representing the network.
included in the encrypted payload as well, in order for the receiving node to
be able to respond.
The use of random IDs to identify the nodes removes the need to know
the destination IP address in order to initiate communication, and hides
the originating IP. It also means that no communication is possible without
knowledge of the ID of the destination node. However, in order for the routing
to be anonymous, the header does not include the ID of the sending and
receiving nodes, but only routing information in the form of an homomor-
phically encrypted SBF. In particular, the network maintainer builds an SBF
representing all the nodes in the network and their respective subnetwork. As
shown in Figure 1, the elements of the set over which the SBF is built are
the IDs of the nodes, while the sets are the subnetworks, each represented
by a label. The SBF built this way, b#, is encrypted using a homomorphic
encryption scheme, as explained in Section 2.1. In this construction we use
the Paillier cryptosystem [14], but any cipher with equivalent homomorphic
properties can be used. In particular, other more lightweight cryptosystems
could be more suitable for resource-constrained devices. The secret key Sk#
of the homomorphic key pair is known by the routing layer, while the public
key Pk# and the encrypted filter EncPk#
(
b#
)
are distributed to all the
nodes. The nodes also know the set of hash functions used in constructing
the filter.
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Table 2 Information available to each stakeholder. The first row identifies cryptographic
keys owned by the stakeholder and information related to the filter; the second row routing
information and IDs of the nodes in the network
Node j Routing Layer Network Mainteiner
EncPk# (b
#) Sk# b#
Hash set Pk#, Sk# (homomorphic key pair)
Pkj , Skj Hash set
Node ID Public key Subnetwork IP Area Node IP Node ID Area Key pair
ID1 Pk1 122.200.64/24 1 IP1 ID1 1 Pk1, Sk1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IDi Pki 122.200.43/24 k IPi IDi k Pki, Ski
Table 2 summarizes the information that each party in the protocol needs
in order to communicate. The information is divided in two sets: information
related to the encryption mechanism (such as public keys), in the upper row;
and information related to network communication (including IDs and IP
addresses), in the lower row.
In this paper, we assume that knowledge of the ID of a node equates
to knowledge of its public key: any suitable key distribution scheme can be
applied to achieve this. The key distribution can in fact coincide with the
strategy used to notify nodes of new IDs they can communicate with, as the
information (both the ID and the public key) needs to be transmitted in order
to enable the node to communicate. While a key distribution strategy would
be out of the scope of this work, we note that existing schemes designed
for anonymity protocols for distributed settings such as [18] can be directly
applied to the proposed scenario.
3.3 Routing Protocol
The anonymous routing protocol is defined in Algorithm 2. Communication
happens between a sender node s and a receiver node r in two different
subnetworks (Δs and Δi respectively). In essence, the sender produces a filter
containing the receiver’s identifier IDr and performs the private Hadamard
product with the encrypted filter EncPk#
(
b#
)
, obtaining e#. The routing
layer can then decrypt the information contained in e# and learn the desti-
nation subnetwork Δi. The protocol makes it possible for s to communicate
with r without knowing it location within the network. At the same time, the
routing layer can route packets without learning their content, nor the sender
and receiver identity. The protocol is schematized in Figure 3.
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Algorithm 2: Anonymous inter-network routing protocol
Communication happens as follows:
1 The sender node s identifies the anonymous identifier IDr of the
receiving node r. s then builds an SBF with IDr as only element, using
the known set of hash functions. Once the filter is built, s counts the
number z of non-zero values in it. Then, the node performs the private
Hadamard product between the filter it just built and the encrypted filter
EncPk#
(
b#
)
, using the multiplicative homomorphic properties of the
cryptosystem. We call the resulting combined encrypted filter e#. Finally,
the sender shuffles e#, and sends it to the gateway, with z and the
encrypted payload EncPkr (msg).
2 The sending gateway relays transparently the information received by s
to the routing layer.
3 The routing layer decrypts e#: the decrypted filter is composed of zeros,
and a number of non-zero values. If the number of non-zero values is
equal to z, then the receiving node r exists. The smallest value i among
the non-zero ones identifies the correct subnetwork to which the
communication will be routed (see Section 2). Finally the routing layer
transmits the encrypted payload EncPkr (msg) to the correct
subnetwork Δi.
4 The gateway of Δi receives the encrypted payload and broadcasts it to all
the nodes in the subnetwork.
5 The intended receiver r receives EncPkr (msg) and decrypts it using its
secret key Skr.
The properties of the spatial Bloom filters introduce the possibility of
false positives and inter-set errors: in the first scenario, an element outside
the sets over which the filter has been built could be recognized as member
of a set; in the inter-set error scenario, an element that is a member of a set
X could be recognized as member of set Y . The former case has no real
implications for the proposed protocol: it would only apply to the case of a
node in the network using non-existing or unknown IDs. But as no public key
is associated to these IDs, communication is impossible. The latter case could
result in the wrong routing being applied to the communication: however, we
note that the probability of this event can be calibrated through the use of
appropriate parameters (such as the length of the filter and the number of
hash functions) during the filter construction, and a filter can be tested after
it has been built (testing for membership all the elements of the construction
set S¯) to verify that no inter-set errors are possible.
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Node s
Routing layer
Node r
z
H(IDr) EncPk# (b
#) = e#
b#r
1
0
1
0
0
EncPkr (IDs|msg)
PAYLOAD
shuffle(e#)
z
HEADER
count(i) = z?
Dec
Sk#
(˜e#) =
0
0
0
i
i
˜e#
z
HEADER
EncPkr (IDs|msg)
PAYLOAD
To subnetwork i
IDs,msg = DecSkr (EncPkr (IDs|msg))
EncPkr (IDs|msg)
PAYLOAD
Figure 3 Operation of the private routing protocol. Node s wants to securely transmit
message msg to node r. Node r belongs to subnetwork i, but s only knows r’s ID (IDr).
Communication proceeds as follows: s generates the SBF related to IDr and counts the
number z of non-zero values in it; the filter is then multiplied (through an homomorphic
encryption operation) by the shared encrypted filter b#. The resulting filter is then sent to
the routing layer, together with z. The routing layer decrypts it, and computes the destination
subnetwork i. The payload (that is, the encrypted message) is then routed to the subnetwork i
and node r, either through a gateway or by broadcast. r receives the message and decrypts it.
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4 Security Analysis
In order to analyse the security of our construction, we discuss three separate
scenarios: in the first, an attacker gains control over a node in the network;
in the second, the attacker controls a subnetwork gateway, and in the third,
the attacker controls the routing layer (or part of it). In all three cases, we
assume the attacker will not actively disrupt network traffic, but will limit
himself to observing traffic visible to him in order to learn information on the
network structure and topology (context information). This is called a semi-
honest behaviour. In the following, we show how in each of the three cases
the attacker is unable to learn any meaningful information on the network
structure, and therefore the security definition is satisfied. Security cannot be
guaranteed in case the attacker controls simultaneously 1) the routing layer
and 2) either one or more nodes, or one or more gateways, or a combination
of the two. The extent to which security is compromised in this case depends
on the number of nodes and gateways controlled, and is limited to the parts
of the network the attacker has visibility of.
Attacker controlling a node. In this case, the attacker can read all informa-
tion sent and received by the node, and learns the IDs of all the other nodes
with which the controlled node can communicate. The attacker also learns
the encrypted filter, but has no information to decrypt it. The attacker cannot
learn the IP addresses corresponding to the nodes, as they are unknown to the
controlled node and cannot be derived from the respective IDs. Similarly, the
attacker cannot learn the network structure (the position of the nodes within
the subnetworks and the number of subnetworks), as the routing of sent and
received packets is achieved anonymously.
Attacker controlling a subnetwork gateway. An attacker controlling a
gateway will learn all the identity of all the nodes in the respective subnet-
work. However, he will not be able to read any information sent and received
by the nodes, as the payloads are encrypted. Similarly, he will not learn the
destination of sent packets or the origin of received ones, as the routing
information e# is encrypted. Finally, the attacker cannot learn the network
structure as per the case above.
Attacker controlling the routing layer. In this case, the attacker will be
able to watch the flow of information between the different subnetworks.
However, due to the properties of the SBF, even being able to decrypt the
encrypted routing information e# will not enable him to learn the identity of
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the receiving node r. Similarly, he cannot learn the identity of the sending
node s, as this is encrypted within the payload, and the sending gateway will
not communicate it to him.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we present a private routing protocol that can be used to
communicate anonymously between different networks. Our protocol can be
applied in a variety of Internet of Things scenarios: from Wireless Sensor
Networks, to interconnected IoT systems composed by different devices or
infrastructures.
Our protocol achieves context privacy by using homomorphic encryp-
tion, tunnelling and the spatial Bloom filters. In particular, we achieve the
following properties: communication between nodes can only be read by the
intended receiver; the network structure and topology (context information) is
kept private to all nodes; the identity and location of the sending and receiving
nodes in two different subnetworks is kept private to the routing layer; and the
routing layer is oblivious to the origin and destination of any communication
between subnetworks. These properties enable context privacy and security
against adversaries who control one or more nodes within the network, or
even the routing layer. Therefore, the proposed anonymous routing protocol
can prevent attacks aimed at taking over control of the network.
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